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COMMENTS
THE PATTERN ELEMENT OF RICO BEFORE AND AFTER
SEDIMA: A LOOK AT BOTH FEDERAL AND FLORIDA
RICO
SANDRA BOWER Ross
T HE RACKETEER Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)' makes it unlawful for any person to: use the proceeds
from a "pattern of racketeering activity"; to acquire an interest in
an enterprise affecting interstate commerce;' acquire or maintain
such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity;3 con-
duct or participate in such an enterprise through a pattern of rack-
eteering activity;4 or conspire to violate any of these provisions.
"Pattern of racketeering activity" is described, but not defined, as
"requir[ing] at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of
which occurred within ten years, (excluding any period of impris-
onment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activ-
ity."" Racketeering activity, in contrast, "means" any of a number
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or
indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire
to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
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of listed state and federal crimes.7 Because Congress chose to de-
scribe this critical element of RICO in terms of what it is not, that
is less than two racketeering acts, instead of what it is, the courts
have been struggling since RICO's passage to determine the con-
tent of the pattern element. Must the acts be connected to each
other by a common scheme or motive, or is relationship to the en-
terprise enough? Should multiple acts in furtherance of a single
scheme be construed as a pattern, or should those acts be consid-
ered part of the same criminal episode and hence, only one act of
racketeering?
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue only
once, in an oblique footnote in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 8 Be-
cause the Court did not decide whether there was a pattern pre-
sent in the case before it, the meaning of its footnote remains open
to interpretation. As a result, not only are the federal courts still
struggling with the definition of pattern, but now they must also
define Sedima.
In this Comment the author analyzes the pattern element both
before and after Sedima and discusses the implications for RICO if
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). Among the acts listed are murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in drugs, mail fraud, wire fraud, and extortionate
credit transactions.
8. 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). In footnote 14 the Court stated:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of racke-
teering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a
pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," § 1961(5) (emphasis
added), not that it "means" two such acts. The implication is that while two acts
are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of any-
thing do not generally form a "pattern." The legislative history supports the view
that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern. As the
Senate Report explained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The
infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering
activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of
continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern." S.Rep. No.
91-617, p. 158 (1969) (emphasis added). Similarly, the sponsor of the Senate bill,
after quoting this portion of the Report, pointed out to his colleagues that "[tihe
term 'pattern' itself requires the showing of a relationship .... So, therefore, proof
of two acts of racketeering activity, without more, does not establish a pattern ...
" 116 CON.. REC. 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan). See also id., at
35193 (statement of Rep. Poff) (RICO "not aimed at the isolated offender");
House Hearings, at 665. Significantly, in defining "pattern" in a later provision of
the same bill, Congress was more enlightening: "criminal conduct forms a pattern
if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, par-
ticipants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by dis-
tinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). This
language may be useful in interpreting other sections of the Act. Cf. Iannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975) [parallel citations omitted].
RICO
pattern requires both separate criminal episodes and a common
scheme or motive. The Comment also examines Florida RICO and
the interpretation of its pattern requirement by the Florida courts.
I. BEFORE SEDIMA: COMMON SCHEME AND SINGLE EPISODE
The cases before Sedima dealt primarily with either of two main
issues: whether the racketeering acts, in order to form a pattern,
must be held together by a common scheme or plan, or whether a
pattern exists if, in the course of a single transaction, multiple acts
occur. Generally, the courts were divided on the need for a com-
mon scheme and found that multiple acts within a single transac-
tion could be considered a pattern of racketeering activity.
A. Common Scheme
One of the earliest cases to deal with the pattern element was
United States v. Stofsky.9 The case involved alleged racketeering
activity by seven leaders and employees of a fur garment union, as
well as four officials from union shop manufacturers. The allega-
tions included twenty-one instances of bribery of union officials to
allow union shop manufacturers to subcontract out work to non-
union shops and twelve occasions when defendants allegedly
threatened non-union shop manufacturers with bodily injury if
they continued to solicit subcontracts from union shops. 10 Citing
the Senate Report on RICO,' the court noted that Congress' main
concern when it enacted the legislation was the "special danger to
legitimate business of a continuity of racketeering activity. '"'2 In
light of this concern, the court found that pattern required "the
racketeering acts [be] connected with each other by some common
scheme, plan or motive.., and not simply a series of disconnected
acts."' 3 The court noted that its construction of pattern was sup-
ported by 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e),'1 a provision of Title 18 passed
along with RICO, that defined a pattern of criminal conduct for
special offender sentencing purposes as "'hav[ing] the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of com-
9. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom. Hoff v. United States, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
10. Id. at 611-12.
11. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969).
12. Id. at 614. See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. at 479, 496 n.14 (quoting
from the Senate Report). The text of footnote 14 is set out in full, supra note 8.
13. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. at 614.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982).
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mission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics and are not isolated events.' ,15
While conceding that the analysis in Stofsky was "far from friv-
olous," the Second Circuit Court in United States v. Weisman"6
nevertheless rejected the conclusion that a common scheme was re-
quired to prevent application of RICO to isolated or sporadic crim-
inal activity. In Weisman the court was dealing with numerous al-
legations of securities and bankruptcy fraud stemming from the
construction and operation of the Westchester Premier Theatre.
The defendants were accused of filing false statements concerning
the prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission and
of systematically skimming money from the theater's ticket and
cQncession sales. The court first noted that the Senate Report re-
lied on in Stofsky did not state whether the relationship must be
between the acts or between the acts and the enterprise, then in-
ferred that the statute meant that the acts must be related only in
terms of conducting the affairs of the enterprise.1 7 The court deter-
mined that Congress must not have intended that the acts them-
selves be related because of the variety of predicate acts Congress
decided would trigger RICO. In addition, the court found that be-
cause the statute makes it unlawful to conduct an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity, it is the enterprise that
is the "unifying link" that precludes isolated criminal activity from
falling within RICO.18
Similarly, in United States v. Elliott,"9 the Fifth Circuit Court
found that although RICO was not aimed at isolated criminal ac-
tivity, that nevertheless did not prevent its application to organiza-
15. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. at 614. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. The text of footnote
14 is set out in full, supra note 8. Similarly, in United States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), the Southern District of New York again ruled that a common scheme or
motive was required in connection with an alleged wire fraud. The defendant argued that
since he was accused of defrauding only one victim, the six occasions of supposed wire fraud
over a four week period constituted only one act. The court rejected this contention, finding
that the lone victim was actually the "connecting link" required to establish a pattern.
16. 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
17. Id. at 1122 n.3.
18. Id. at 1122. It is interesting that both Stofsky and Weisman rely on the statutory
construction principle in pari materia to reach contrary results. In Stofsky, the court rea-
soned that it would be illogical for Congress to mean two different things by "pattern" in
the context of two pieces of legislation passed simultaneously, while the Weisman court, just
as plausibly, found that since Congress passed both definitions simultaneously, they must
have intended that the two be different. Otherwise, Congress would have made them
identical.
19. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Delph v. United States, 439 U.S.
953 (1978). See also United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980) (although two acts
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tions engaged in "diversified activity." In fact, it was precisely this
type of organization that Congress targeted in passing RICO.20
The analysis in Weisman and Elliott is better reasoned than
that in Stofsky. Surely, if RICO means anything, it must apply to
an organization that operates by criminal activity, even if that ac-
tivity is diverse. Otherwise, two-bit mail frauders are subject to the
severest of penalties, while multi-crime conglomerates go free, only
because the latter were sophisticated enough to branch out. Cer-
tainly an enterprise that traffics in drugs on the one hand and ped-
dles pornography on the other is what Congress had in mind when
it passed RICO. While the acts may be related to each other, they
should not have to be.
Nevertheless, the common scheme requirement lived on in some
jurisdictions in pre-Sedima days. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in United States v. Brooklier" held that in order to convict,
the jury must find that the racketeering offenses were connected
by a common scheme, plan or motive. Even though the court dis-
approved of the portion of the jury instructions that required ac-
of bribery were related to each other and to the enterprise, the acts need only be related to
the enterprise to establish pattern).
20.
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisicated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force,
fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power
through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan
sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of
narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3)
this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes;
(4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Na-
tion's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, in-
terfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce,
threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation
and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in
the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally
admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to
bear on the unlawful activities of those engaging in organized crime and because
sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in
scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
21. 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
326 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:321
tual participation on the part of the defendants to show their guilt
in a RICO conspiracy, the court explicitly stated that a common
scheme was required. 2
These ccnflicting decisions could be reconciled if the courts read
common 'scheme broadly to include the plan of furthering the en-
terprise, instead of the more immediate result, i.e., mail fraud or
arson. Requiring then that acts be in furtherance of a common
scheme would be the same as requiring that they be related to the
enterprise. The courts should not lose sight of RICO's underlying
premise, that is, the notion that the traditional criminal model is
not always appropriate in today's complex society. The model of
an individual perpetrator committing murder or robbery in one in-
cident no longer suffices for all antisocial behavior; forcing RICO
into these common law pigeon-holes will not achieve Congress'
goals.
B. Single Episode
The second major pre-Sedima issue was whether multiple acts in
a single transaction could constitute a pattern for RICO purposes.
The argument advanced by defendants was that inherent in the
concept of pattern is the notion of continuity, of repetition. The
Oxford English Dictionary defines pattern as "design," "[a]n ar-
rangement or order of things or activity in abstract senses: order or
form discernible in things, actions, ideas, situations." The plausible
objection raised by pre-Sedima defendants was that a single crimi-
nal episode did not indicate the necessary design or order of
things. RICO was not intended to apply to gunmen who rob a 7-
Eleven and take the clerk hostage; those two acts do not constitute
a pattern of behavior (or so the argument went). Before Sedima,
that argument generally lost. The courts found that two acts, even
in a single criminal episode, satisfied RICO's pattern requirement.
Sometimes that finding was made grudgingly, however. In
United States v. Moeller, 3 District Judge Newman expounded on
what he termed the "common sense" interpretation of pattern
which, he believed, would not extend to a kidnapping and arson
occurring on the same day, at the same place and in furtherance of
a single plan to commit that arson.
22. Id. at 1222.
23. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
RICO
Were the question open, I would have seriously doubted whether
the word 'pattern' as used in § 1962(c) should be construed to
mean two acts occurring at the same place on the same day in the
course of the same criminal episode. While the statutory defini-
tion makes clear that a pattern can consist of only two acts, I
would have thought the common sense interpretation of the word
'pattern' implies acts occurring in different criminal episodes,
episodes that are at least somewhat separated in time and place
yet still sufficiently related by purpose to demonstrate a con-
tinuity of activity.2
However, Judge Newman found that the Second Circuit Court's
decision in United States v. Parness25 foreclosed any resolution
other than a finding that a pattern existed.26 Parness involved a
defendant who was convicted of acquiring a foreign gambling ca-
sino through a pattern of racketeering activity. The predicate acts
constituting the pattern were two counts of causing interstate
transportation of stolen property and one count of causing a per-
son to travel in interstate commerce in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud.
It is open to question whether Parness actually did foreclose
Judge Newman's analysis. 28 The defendant in Parness challenged
the statute for vagueness and did not argue that the acts did not
constitute a pattern. Even if challenged on that basis, the facts in
Parness are distinguishable from Moeller. The acts in Parness
took place over a longer period of time, even though they were part
of a single scheme, while the arson in Moeller appears to have been
a one day affair. Nevertheless, the court in Moeler found that
"there is no indication in Parness that the Court of Appeals re-
quires anything more for the establishment of a 'pattern' within
the meaning of section 1961(5) than two acts of racketeering, re-
gardless of whether their occurrence implies continuing activity. 29
Similarly, in United States v. Starnes,"0 the court found that a
conspiracy to commit a single act of arson satisfied the pattern ele-
ment because the conspirators contemplated several acts to accom-
plish that objective. The acts included travelling interstate to set
24. Id. at 57.
25. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
26. 402 F. Supp. at 58.
27. 503 F.2d at 438.
28. 402 F. Supp. at 58 n.7.
29. Id.
30. 644 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
19871
328 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:321
the fire, setting the fire, and using the mails to complete the
scheme to defraud the insurer. All three were found to be separate
acts of racketeering. "[T]he fact that there is but one objective un-
derlying the separate acts does not diminish the applicability of
RICO to those acts."'
Even separate acts are sometimes unnecessary, as long as there
are at least two offenses present. In a particularly mechanistic ap-
plication of the rule, the Eleventh Circuit Court in United States
v. Bascaro3 2 found a pattern to exist when the defendant both pos-
sessed and imported marijuana. Pattern "requires the commission
of at least two predicate crimes,"3 3 the court noted (emphasis in
original). The court found that because possessing and importing
marijuana were two separate crimes, a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity existed. However, the Eleventh Circuit Court's analysis
seems applicable only to the limited number of activities that are
listed in section 1961(1)(D). Unlike the other four subsections of
section 1961 in which racketeering activity is defined as an "act,"
subsection (D) defines activity as "any offense" involving securities
fraud or narcotics. It is arguable that Bascaro, in which two crimes
were found sufficient for a pattern even when both crimes actually
arose out of the same act, will be limited only to section 1961(1)(D)
"activity."
An explanation for the pre-Sedima reluctance of the courts to
reject RICO when there were multiple acts within the same epi-
sode can be found in the Seventh Circuit case of United States v.
Weatherspoon.4 There the court found that the operator of a
beauty school engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity when
she mailed, on several occasions, false information to the Veteran's
Administration in an effort to defraud that agency. The defendant
argued that because there was only a single scheme to defraud,
only one "act" of racketeering had occurred .3 The court suggested
that adopting her position would implicate RICO's constitutional-
ity, in light of two district court rulings3 6 requiring that the acts be
connected by a common scheme. A finding that separate and unre-
31. Id. at 678.
32. 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub norn. Hobson v. United States, 472
U.S. 1017 (1985).
33. Id. at 1360.
34. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
35. Id. at 601.
36. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Hoff v. United States, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States
v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
RICO
lated schemes must exist would raise constitutional vagueness
problems, the court concluded. 7 It is ironic that the court chose to
reject the argument because of the precedent of two district court
opinions. What is even more interesting is the lack of any consider-
ation that the notions of common scheme or single episode were
judicially imposed constraints on RICO. Those words do not ap-
pear in RICO, nor were they discussed in Congress before RICO's
passage. If mechanically applied, these judicially-created elements
threaten to gut RICO.
A better approach would be to consider the "single episode" in
the context of the kind of enterprise that is involved. For example,
the Eleventh Circuit Court in United States v. Watchmaker38 was
faced with the question of whether the shootings of three police
officers at a club in Tampa, Florida, by a member of the Outlaw
Motorcycle Club constituted a pattern of racketeering behavior.
The court resolved the issue merely by stating that other courts
have rejected the contention that "acts which are part of the same
scheme or transaction cannot qualify as distinct predicate acts,"39
and holding that three separate murders could therefore be consid-
ered three predicate acts constituting a RICO offense. Although
reaching the right result, the court should have abandoned this
mode of analysis by discussing the shootings in terms of the nature
of the enterprise-here, the motorcycle club-and asking whether
the acts furthered the enterprise or indicated continuity. That
way, the court could have spared future jurists from wrangling
with the idea of single criminal episodes. Sometimes RICO should
apply in a single episode, sometimes it should not. For example, in
Watchmaker, prosecution of the gunman under RICO seems ap-
propriate. The gunman should not be spared from RICO simply
because he was fortunate enough to find the officers all at one
place, provided that the shootings were shown to have furthered
the enterprise, the outlaw Motorcycle Club. On the other hand, it
made little sense to use RICO against the "enterprise" in Moeller,
where it was apparently a one time scheme. The participants tem-
37. 581 F.2d at 601 n.2. This catch-22 resurfaces in the wake of Sedima, because the
courts have required both a common scheme and separate episodes. Only if episode is con-
strued narrowly-on the same day, for example-will the two be able to coexist. If episode is
read broadly, then confusion will result as courts attempt to determine when the acts are
connected enough to be part of a common scheme, yet unconnected enough to be separate
transactions.
38. 761 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 879 (1986) (decided slightly
more than one month before Sedima).
39. Id. at 1475.
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porarily banded together burn a building, but it does not appear
that there was any ongoing organization. Inquiring into the nature
of the enterprise would allow the courts to make more sense of the
cases, or at least, resolve the cases in a way that makes sense.
II. SEDIMA AND FOOTNOTE 14
Sedima involved a Belgian corporation (Sedima), which had en-
tered into a joint venture with Imrex Co., an American exporter, to
supply items to a firm in Belgium.'0 In its suit against Imrex,
Sedima alleged that Imrex had overbilled and cheated Sedima of
its rightful share of the profits. Among other charges, Sedima con-
tended that Imrex and two of its officers had violated RICO based
on alleged acts of mail and wire fraud."' Although the existence of
a pattern was not at issue, the court nonetheless commented on
the definition of this element of RICO, noting that "[t]he 'ex-
traordinary' uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to be
primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses ...
and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful
concept of 'pattern.' ",42 Although extensively relied on in subse-
quent decisions, the Court's footnote really said nothing new.43
The Court merely reiterated statements in the Senate Report and
comments made by the legislators during the debate over RICO,
then noted that the definition of "pattern" differs from the other
definitional provisions in section 1961 in that it uses "requires" in-
stead of "means." "The implication is that while two acts are nec-
essary, they may not be sufficient."'44 While this may not be a star-
tling revelation, the Sedima decision nevertheless has led to
changes in the approach to the pattern element taken by the lower
federal courts.
Interestingly, Justice Powell's dissent in Sedima seems to have
had the most significant impact on the lower courts' treatment of
the pattern element. Powell suggested that because pattern is de-
fined as requiring at least two acts, the definition should be inter-
preted to mean that something more than the presence of the
predicate acts is required for a "pattern" to be proved. 5 Powell
40. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 483.
41. Id. at 500.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 496 n.14. The text of footnote 14 is set out in full supra note 8.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 527 (Powell, J., dissenting).
RICO
cited an American Bar Association Report46 which recommended
that pattern be interpreted to require that the racketeering acts be
related to each other, that they be part of some common scheme,
and that there be some continuity or threat of continuing criminal
activity. "By construing 'pattern' to focus on the manner in which
the crime was perpetrated, courts could go a long way toward lim-
iting the reach of the statute to its intended target-organized
crime," Powell wrote.47
III. THE AFTERMATH OF SEDIMA
If the Court in Sedima intended to provide the long-awaited
meaning for pattern, it failed. The divergent interpretations of the
lower federal courts show that the meaning of pattern is still not
clear. In the circuit courts, Sedima is cited frequently, but the
courts seem to rule precisely as they would have without the Su-
preme Court's decision. The district courts often cite Sedima as
well, but have reached no consensus about what Sedima requires.
One apparent result of Sedima, however, is that some courts are
now adopting the argument that there can be no pattern within a
single episode. Additionally, some courts are requiring that the
racketeering acts be connected by a common scheme. There is still
much disagreement about what pattern means, but the arguments
that lost prior to Sedima now seem to be making headway.
A. Circuit Court Jurisprudence
Most of the post-Sedima circuit court cases that deal with pat-
tern are in the area of civil RICO, an area of expressed concern by
several courts." Despite the concern, and the pleas of distress,49
the courts are generally allowing the RICO claims.
46. Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force, 1985 ABA SEC. CORP. BANKING Bus. L.
70-92 (1985).
47. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 528 (Powell, J., dissenting).
48. See Illinois Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1985):
Perhaps we can take solace in the fact that the Illinois Department of Revenue
promised in oral argument that such tax collection cases will be few, but we doubt,
once the cause of action is established, that this will be true. We can only hope
that this decision appears to Congress as the distress flag that it is, and that Con-
gress will act to limit, as only it is empowered to, the statute's application to cases
such as the one before us now.
See also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 529 (Powell, J., dissenting):
It is neither necessary to the Court's decision, nor in my view correct, to read the
civil RICO provisions so expansively. We ruled in Turkette and Russello that the
statute must be read broadly and construed liberally to effectuate its remedial
1987]
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One explanation for the grudging application of RICO in several
of the circuit court cases is that each case involved allegations of
numerous predicate acts, rather than merely two or three. For ex-
ample, in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association
v. Touche Ross & Co.,50 the court found that nine acts of wire and
mail fraud over a three-year period satisfied the pattern require-
ment under Sedima. The court rejected the defendants' contention
that the predicate acts were all part of the same alleged scheme to
induce banks to extend credit to a certain business and so should
be regarded as a single criminal episode. In rejecting this argument
the court restated its earlier holding in United States v. Watch-
maker51 (pre-Sedima) in which it ruled that acts which are part of
the same scheme or transaction may qualify as predicate acts. The
court stated: "The standard which has been applied in this Circuit
is whether each act constitutes 'a separate violation of the [state or
federal] statute' governing the conduct in question .... If distinct
statutory violations are found, the predicate acts will be considered
to be distinct irrespective of the circumstances under which they
arose."
52
Similarly, in Illinois Department of Revenue v. Phillips,53 the
Seventh Circuit Court ruled that a defendant who filed fraudulent
sales tax returns for each month over a nine month period had
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. The court cited
United States v. Weatherspoon5 4 (pre-Sedima) for the proposition
that each mailing in a mail fraud scheme is a separate act of racke-
teering activity.55 Perhaps a better approach than simply counting
the number of mailings, as the court did in Phillips, is to examine
purposes, but like the legislative history to which the Court alludes, it is clear we
were referring there to RICO's criminal provisions. It does not necessarily follow
that the same principles apply to RICO's private civil provisions.
49. Phillips, 771 F.2d at 317.
50. 782 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1986).
51. 761 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1985).
52. 782 F.2d at 971 (quoting United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d at 1475).
53. 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985).
54. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1985).
55. 771 F.2d at 313. Despite the court's obvious reluctance to allow RICO to be used as a
method for states to recover delinquent taxes, it held that it is up to Congress to narrow
RICO's scope, if it so chooses. The court stated:
Nevertheless, it does not seem fitting for us to attempt to narrow the statute in
ways which are nearly impossible to rationalize merely to exclude subjects of this
kind. For to say that Congress did not anticipate this subject is not to say that
Congress would have excluded it if the subject had been brought explicitly to its
attention. Congress appears to have preferred a broad statute, even if overinclu-
sion might result.
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both the number and the periodic nature of the acts. Such an anal-
ysis was used by the Eighth Circuit Court in Alexander Grant &
Co. v. Tiffany Industries,8 in which the court found a pattern in
twenty-six acts of mail fraud and four acts of wire fraud in connec-
tion with a single scheme to obtain a favorable audit. The court
wrote: "The number and nature of acts, together with allegations
demonstrating their similar purposes, results, participants, victims,
and methods of commission, bespeak a sufficient 'continuity plus
relationship' to satisfy the Supreme Court's concerns in Sedima
that RICO not be extended to reach sporadic activity.""7
More difficult to explain is the Fifth Circuit Court's decision in
R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt58 where the court found that the
defendants, who mailed two false invoices concerning the repair of
a sewing machine, had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. The court interpreted Sedima's language that "while two acts
are necessary, they may not be sufficient"59 to imply that two "iso-
lated" acts would not constitute a pattern. Here, because the two
alleged mailings were related, there was a pattern of activity.
The court ruled this way despite its professed concern about the
scope of civil RICO.
An allegation of fraud in a contract action can transform an ordi-
nary state law claim into a federal racketeering charge. It may be
unfortunate for federal courts to be burdened by this kind of
case, but it is not for this Court to question policies decided by
Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court. The broad language
Id. at 317 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 389 (7th
Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
While concern about the scope of RICO is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth
noting that sentiment, if only for possible insight into future decisions refining pattern, as
well as the entire RICO statute.
56. 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 799 (1986).
57. Id. at 718 n.i. See also James v. Meinke, 778 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1985) (multiple
allegations of stock fraud involving single investment scheme constituted a pattern). Some
district courts also are following this lead in which numerous acts over some period of time
are found to constitute a pattern. See United States v. Dellacroce, 625 F. Supp. 1387
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (15 acts over long period constitute pattern); United States v. Louis, 625 F.
Supp 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (street gang's 85 acts over 11-year period sufficient to show con-
tinuity plus relationship), appeal dismissed sub nom. United States v. Tom, 787 F.2d 65 (2d
Cir. 1986); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (multiple acts
over 18 month period constitute pattern), rev'd on other grounds, 779 F.2d 885 (2d Cir.
1985).
58. 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
59. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
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of the statute and the Sedima decision provide us with clear
guidance.60
But it seems the court could as easily have been "clearly guided"
by Sedima to find that no pattern existed here. What the court has
ignored is Sedima's call to examine pattern in terms of "common
parlance." 61 Common usage surely would not ascribe a pattern of
racketeering behavior to two false invoices dealing with the repair
of sewing machines. Also considering RICO's purpose, the result in
R.A.G.S. seems clearly wrong. Certainly Congress was not referring
to one instance of sewing machine repair fraud when it talked
about "highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity
that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by
unlawful conduct ....", Surely common parlance would require
more than one mailing by the defendants and one mailing by the
defendants' attorney. At least, a pattern implies that there has
been some sort of observable trait, a tendency for certain behavior,
or as Sedima requires, the threat of continuity. There was none of
that here. Even if it is true that RICO is to be liberally construed
and ambiguity should be resolved in favor of remedy, there are
limits to a liberal construction.
Perhaps, and this is mere conjecture, the court is expanding
RICO beyond its intended scope precisely because of its expressed
concern about RICO's breadth. That is, if the courts adopt a broad
view, Congress-a different body than the one which passed
RICO-will strictly limit or kill it.
Of course, RICO is not receiving expansive treatment in all cir-
cuits. In Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer,3 the Eighth Circuit Court
found that several acts of mail and wire fraud undertaken in pur-
suit of a wrongful conversion of petroleum gas did not constitute a
pattern of racketeering activity. The court held that the defend-
ants had engaged in only "one isolated fraudulent scheme," and
that there was no evidence of a threat of similar gas conversion
schemes in other locations.0 While the result seems to be correct,
the court's focus on a "single scheme" is misplaced. As will be seen
in the district court jurisprudence, 5 a blanket requirement of mul-
60. R.A.G.S., 774 F.2d at 1355.
61. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
63. 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 257.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 79-108.
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tiple schemes is not workable, particularly if the requirement is
interpreted to apply to all subsections of section 1962. Application
of a multiple scheme requirement to subsection (b), for example,
would render the statute meaningless. Multiple acts taken in pur-
suit of acquiring a single enterprise would not, under this analysis,
constitute a pattern. The single goal of taking over CBS,6 6 for ex-
ample, would arguably be only one scheme, and hence outside the
scope of RICO. But if a purpose of RICO is to "eradicate organized
crime," and one facet of organized crime is the infiltration of legiti-
mate business, then a multiple scheme requirement is clearly con-
trary to congressional intent.6 7
The Second Circuit Court criticized this requirement of multiple
schemes as "incongruous" in its decision in United States v. Ian-
niello.6 Instead of requiring multiple schemes, the court found
that a pattern results when a "person commits at least two acts
that have the common purpose of furthering a continuing criminal
enterprise with which that person is associated." 9 Similarly, the
better reasoning for Superior Oil would have been to examine the
underlying theft of gas that was at issue. That theft was really only
one continuous taking, and really only one act.70 If the court re-
quired multiple schemes to constitute a pattern, any future acts
taken by the defendants in response to changes in Superior Oil's
operations would not form a pattern. Even if Superior Oil shut
down the affected line and opened another, under a single scheme
analysis the defendants could still commit further acts of stealing
from Superior Oil without a pattern being formed. On the other
hand, if the court followed the reasoning in Ianniello, additional
acts committed in furtherance of the criminal enterprise would
constitute a pattern.
66. See Paul S. Mullin & Assocs. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 541 (D. Del. 1986); infra
notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
67.
[O]rganized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained
from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and
fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dan-
gerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation .... [Tihis money and power
are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions
and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes ....
Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). See supra note 20.
68. 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 192.
70. Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 253-54 (8th Cir. 1986).
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It is helpful, as the court did in Ianniello, to consider pattern in
the context of its relationship to the enterprise. For example, in
United States v. Ellison,71 the defendant was convicted of violat-
ing section 1962(c) by participating in an enterprise that con-
ducted its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Ellison
was the founder and leader of a white supremacy group known as,
among other things, the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the
Lord (CSA). The government alleged commission of two predicate
acts of arson: burning Ellison's sister's house so she could collect
the insurance proceeds, and burning a church whose members al-
legedly included homosexuals. "These activities were intended to
produce operating funds, to plunder the property of certain 'unac-
ceptable' groups, and to hasten the collapse of the government." 72
The court found that proof of the two arsons sufficiently showed a
pattern
because they stemmed from the same or similar purposes, in-
volved the same group of participants, and had similar methods
of commission. The evidence also showed that there was every
likelihood that such activities would continue indefinitely. We are
satisfied that the government amply fulfilled its burden of show-
ing a pattern of racketeering activity and its direct relationship to
CSA as an enterprise. 71
To the court, the relationship of the predicate acts to CSA as an
enterprise was key. This relationship is a useful way of analyzing
pattern, at least in terms of 1962(c). The clear statutory language
of 1962(c) prohibits participation in "the conduct of [an] enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. ' 7 It is
conducting an enterprise through a pattern of activity that is un-
lawful here; courts should not lose sight of that.75 If the enterprise
is kept in sight, the existence of a pattern may also become visible.
Finally, a particularly thoughtful approach to pattern was taken
by the Fourth Circuit Court in International Data Bank v.
71. 793 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 415 (1986).
72. Id. at 945.
73. Id. at 950. It is interesting to note that both Ellison and Superior Oil were decided
by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. While Superior Oil requires multiple schemes, Elli-
son focuses on the relationship of the acts to the enterprise. Cf. Alexander Grant & Co. v.
Tiffany Industries, 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1985) (pattern sufficiently established in series of
acts undertaken with goal of obtaining a favorable audit), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 799
(1986).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
75. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Zepkin .7 At issue in that case was whether an allegedly fraudulent
statement in a newly formed corporation's prospectus constituted
a pattern of racketeering activity when the prospectus reached nu-
merous investors. The court determined that it did not. "In the
present case, the element of relationship between the predicate
acts is undoubtedly present, but the element of continuity is ab-
sent. ' 77 The court noted the two distinct camps of post-Sedima
jurisprudence, but rejected what it termed a "mechanical test,"
calling a RICO pattern a "matter of criminal dimension and
degree."
The number of predicate acts is not an appropriate litmus test, as
the perpetration of numerous acts of mail and wire fraud 'may be
no indication of the requisite continuity of the underlying fraudu-
lent scheme.' [citations omitted]. The focus of Superior Oil on
the scope of criminal activity is proper, but the 'one continuing
scheme' test enunciated in that case will not always hold true. As
the Lipin Enterprises court noted, such a test may 'allow a large,
continuous scheme to escape the enhanced penalties of RICO lia-
bility' [citations omitted] 8
B. District Court Jurisprudence
The district courts also disagree as to what Sedima requires. As
in pre-Sedima days, the disagreement focuses on whether there
should be a common scheme; unlike the pre-Sedima cases, how-
ever, the courts now tend to require one. 79 The old argument that
there can be no pattern within a single episode is also experiencing
newfound approval. And perhaps illogically, the courts often are
requiring both a common scheme and different episodes. Because
the reasoning of those courts requiring either relatedness or differ-
ent episodes, but not both, is similar to the pre-Sedima cases, only
the cases which require both relatedness and different episodes are
discussed at any length here.
76. 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1987).
77. Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 155.
79. See Conan Properties v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (two acts
which relate to each other and arise out of the same scheme satisfy pattern requirements);
Systems Research, Inc. v. Random, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (predicate acts
must be sufficiently related to constitute a pattern).
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In Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc, 80 District
Judge Shadur found that two mailings-of a phony contract and a
kickback payment-did not satisfy the pattern element of RICO.
(Shadur also observed that three alleged additional kickbacks over
an 11-month period also did not constitute a pattern because the
payments were in furtherance of the same fraudulent scheme.)
True enough, 'pattern' connotes similarity, hence the cases'
proper emphasis on relatedness of the constituent acts. But 'pat-
tern' also connotes a multiplicity of events: Surely the continuity
inherent in the term presumes repeated criminal activity, not
merely repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activity. It
places a real strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent
effort, implemented by several fraudulent acts, as a 'pattern of
racketeering activity.'81
Judge Shadur revisited the issue a few months later in United
States v. Yonan,82 which involved a lawyer accused of making
seven bribes in a scheme to fix several cases in the Cook County
Circuit Court. Shadur found that Yonan's activity did constitute a
pattern under RICO, even though the payments were all made to
one person and, arguably, were made in pursuit of a single fraudu-
lent scheme. Shadur distinguished the case from Inryco:
"[S]eparate acts of bribery to fix ten separate cases, involving as
many different criminal defendants, contrast sharply with the
mailing of more than one letter to implement a single kickback
scheme (the situation in Inryco)."8 3
Shadur could as easily have found that the kickback payments
in Inryco constituted a pattern under RICO. If, as in Yonan, the
kickbacks were seen as separate payments, rather than install-
ments of a single payment, then five payments surely constituted a
pattern. That is particularly so in light of the extended time period
over which the payments were made. Judge Shadur is correct in
requiring some continuity of crime; his mistake was in not seeing
the continuity in the case before him.
The court in Allington v. Carpenter84 adopted Shadur's reason-
ing in Inryco, finding that multiple episodes are required, both by
legislative history and by Sedima. Allington involved a scheme to
80. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
81. Id. at 831 (emphasis in original).
82. 622 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Il. 1985).
83. Id. at 728.
84. 619 F. Supp. 474 (C.D. Calif. 1985).
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falsely promise high rates of return on loans secured by worthless
promissory notes on real estate trust deeds. Several fraudulently
induced loans were alleged to have resulted from the scheme. In
finding that three acts of wire fraud in furtherance of the scheme
did not constitute a pattern, the court wrote: "[R]acketeering ac-
tivity must include racketeering acts sufficiently unconnected in
time or substance to warrant consideration as separate criminal
episodes."8 5 Here, according to the court, each act was part of the
same criminal episode: a phone call to induce the victim to send
money to Switzerland, the victim's wiring of the money the next
day, and a telephone call six weeks later to set up an account
transferring the money.86
At the same time, however, the acts must be related to each
other through some common scheme or motive in order to satisfy
the continuity plus relationship standard of Sedima.87 Thus, the
plaintiff is put in the dilemma of showing that the acts are related
enough to show continuity, yet unconnected enough to be separate
transactions. This is a difficult task at best, impossible at worst.88
Recent cases continue to rely on the requirement of both relat-
edness and unconnectedness to exclude RICO's application. In
Fleet Management Systems v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 9 the
court held that eight instances of mail and wire fraud over a two-
year period did not constitute a pattern because it was a "single
criminal episode" in pursuit of a single fraudulent scheme. The
85. Id. at 478.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 477-78. "The relatedness of the predicate acts is established through proof of
common perpetrators, common methods of commission, or common victims."
88. But not even all Judge Shadur's colleagues in the Northern District of Illinois adopt
in full his analysis of RICO and Sedima. In Systems Research, Inc. v. Random, Inc., 614 F.
Supp. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1985), the court found a pattern in several acts of mail fraud in connec-
tion with a scheme to defraud an employment agency out of its commissions for placing job
applicants. The court, without analysis, found that because mail and wire fraud were listed
as prohibited activities under the statute and were "alleged to be related to the scheme to
divert applicants from the plaintiffs," a pattern had been sufficiently alleged. Id. at 497.
See also Torwest DBC Inc. v. Dick, 628 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo. 1986) (no pattern where
there was "only one purpose, one result, one set of participants, one victim and one method
of commission . . ."), afJ'd, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987); Lipin Enters. v. Lee, 625 F. Supp.
1098 (N.D. I11. 1985) (12 acts of mail fraud insufficient because failure to allege continuity
necessary to establish pattern), aff'd, 803 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1986); Graham v. Slaughter, 624
F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (multiple episodes are required, but not necessarily multiple
schemes); Professional Assets Management v. Penn Square Bank, 616 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D.
Okla. 1985) (separate fraudulent actions in preparation of audit report still part of single
transaction and so do not constitute a pattern).
89. 627 F. Supp. 550 (CD. Ill. 1986).
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court noted that RICO's broad sweep in recent years has been due
to the inclusion of mail and wire fraud in the statute as predicate
acts. "The potential effects of reading two related mail or wire
fraud violations as forming a 'pattern' on our federal system are
staggering and can lead to some totally unforeseeable results," the
court wrote. 0 The court then suggested that a college student who
turned back the odometer on a car he was selling and then both
called and wrote a friend concerning the deal could be subject to
prosecution under the current reading of RICO. "Such a result is
patently absurd. Although the student has committed a crime, he
certainly is not involved in the kind of ongoing criminal enterprise
that characterizes mob activity. Although the statute's language ar-
guably applies to the foregoing example, Congress certainly did not
intend that result."91
No doubt Congress did not intend that result. But it is hard to
see how this college student would be prosecuted even under the
current reading of RICO. Can he be both the enterprise and the
person associated with it? The court's analogy is poor, but it is
prompted out of the ever-present concern that RICO is being used
most often for "garden-variety fraud" and not for mobsters. Citing
the American Bar Association Report, the court noted that "[o]nly
9% of all civil RICO cases have involved allegations of criminal
activity normally associated with professional criminals. The cen-
tral purpose that Congress sought to promote through civil RICO
is now a mere footnote. '92 While mail and wire fraud remain as
predicate offenses, the court noted, the "concept of 'a pattern of
racketeering activity' can and should be read narrowly to confine
its reach to the type of conduct Congress had in mind."93 Thus,
pattern requires "two or more criminal episodes through which the
enterprise achieves its illegal goal."94 The episodes must be related
by "similar purposes, results participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise.., interrelated by distinguishing charac-
teristics and not [be] isolated events." 95 The court then found that
the mail and wire fraud violations involved only one criminal epi-
sode-a scheme to market the plaintiff's computer program under
a different name-and that there was no threat of ongoing activity.
90. Id. at 554-55.
91. Id. at 555 n.2.
92. Id. at 555.
93. Id. at 557.
94. Id. at 559.
95. Id. (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14).
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As in Inryco, the court's equation of a single scheme with a sin-
gle criminal episode is in error. The defendants engaged in numer-
ous fraudulent acts over a two-year period, albeit with the goal of
defrauding a single victim. The goals of punishing ongoing criminal
activity and avoiding severe sanctions for sporadic or isolated acts
would surely be satisfied by prosecuting the defendants for com-
mitting multiple acts over a long period of time.
Although it used much of the same rhetoric, the New Jersey Dis-
trict Court reached the proper result in Kredietbank, N.V. v.
Joyce Morris, Inc. 6 The case dealt with the mailing of two false
affidavits in support of a lawsuit to recover on a loan. The court
rejected the Fifth Circuit Court's holding in R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc.
v. Hyatt9 7 in finding that pattern required something more than
these two mailings.
Congress nowhere indicated that we should redefine our common
notion of what constitutes a pattern of activity to include a single
repetition of a single act in some circumscribed circumstance,
simply because two acts have occurred. Where a single criminal
act is repeated against a second victim, or repeated in a time and
place removed from its first commission, the two acts arguably
suggest a design or configuration, and may satisfy the pattern re-
quirement. But the repetition of an act taken against a single vic-
tim or set of victims following closely on the heels of the original
wrong, in some circumscribed circumstance, is completely
unidimensional. 8
Here, the court properly viewed the relatedness and continuity
notions as tools in determining whether a pattern exists. There is
less of the mechanistic discussion seen in other decisions, i.e. single
victim equals single criminal episode and hence, no pattern. In-
stead the court apparently is trying to infuse some common sense
into the discussion.
Perhaps a good way of approaching the relatedness/single epi-
sode dilemma is that promoted by at least one judge in Illinois'
Northern District. Judge Susan Getzendanner first stated in Gra-
ham v. Slaughter9 the theory that while multiple transactions are
96. No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, newer case
file).
97. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
98. No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 1986) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, newer cases
file).
99. 624 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. 11. 1985).
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required, multiple schemes are not. "[A]n open-ended scheme may
include a sufficient number of independent criminal episodes to
satisfy the 'continuity' factor of Sedima."'00 As Getzendanner
notes, it is possible that Judge Shadur implicity adopted this the-
ory in Yonan. In Graham, twenty predicate acts of mail and wire
fraud in connection with the embezzlement of about $60,000 over a
two-year period were found to satisfy the pattern element. The
court noted that the acts alleged were not "ministerial acts per-
formed in the execution of a single fraudulent transaction, but ap-
pear[ed] to be independently motivated .... ,"10 Even so, the court
apparently believed that RICO should not apply in this context
and reiterated the Seventh Circuit Court's message to Congress
pleading for a limit to the statute's private application. 102
Even without congressional action, however, Judge Getzendan-
ner was loath to allow a RICO claim based on several supposedly
fraudulent mailings in connection with a group of physicians who
contracted to provide emergency room care in Medical Emergency
Service Associates v. Foulke.10 3 The complaint alleged that the
doctors persuaded a hospital to terminate its relationship with
Medical Emergency Services Associates (MESA) and that the doc-
tors provided the same emergency room services through another
association, in breach of their fiduciary duty to MESA. Several
mailings in which they failed to disclose their plan to MESA con-
stituted the predicate acts for the RICO claim. The court held that
there was only a single transaction and a single injury, and there-
fore, no pattern. "This case falls within that part of Inryco with
which I agree. Multiple mailings in furtherance of a single criminal
episode are insufficient to allege a pattern of racketeering under
section 1961, ''1 °4 Getzendanner wrote. Getzendanner found this
ruling consistent with the controlling Seventh Circuit Court deci-
sion in Illinois Department of Revenue v. Phillips,0 5 because each
mailing in Phillips constituted a separate fraud. Here, she wrote,
no mailing resulted in separate injury or separate fraud.
Judge Getzendanner was given the opportunity to further ex-
plain these two decisions in a third case, Heritage Insurance Co. of
100. Id. at 225.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
103. 633 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Il1. 1986).
104. Id. at 157.
105. 771 F.2d 312.
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America v. First National Bank00 which, according to the court,
involved a set of facts falling somewhere in between the two previ-
ous cases. Heritage involved a bank that had entered into several
escrow agreements between an insolvent contractor and the State
of Illinois. Instead of maintaining the escrow agreements, the bank
used the payments to retire the contractor's debt with the bank.
There were five escrow agreements, which involved about twelve
mailings over a six month period.
The court first restated its earlier holdings that repeated crimi-
nal acts affecting a single victim, involving the same or similar pur-
pose and using the same means, may nonetheless constitute a pat-
tern under RICO. "Otherwise, the requirement that criminal acts
be 'related' as well as 'continuous' would be meaningless, since the
relationship in most circumstances would vitiate a finding of con-
tinuity.' 11 7 Examining this case in light of Graham and Foulke,
the court declined to view the fraud as a single scheme to misap-
propriate escrow funds and found that because there were five sep-
arate agreements executed on four occasions, a pattern had been
sufficiently alleged.
Getzendanner's approach seems to make good sense, at least in
that it allows inclusion of some single victim scams within RICO.
Although still capable of being manipulated, 08 at least it is a step
away from rigidly stating that multiple mailings in a single scheme
does or does not equal RICO.
IV. FLORIDA Rico
Like its federal counterpart, the Florida Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act'0 9 was motivated by a desire to com-
bat organized crime. 1 0 As first enacted, it was similar to federal
106. 629 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
107. Id. at 1416.
108. Id. at 1417. The court noted that if the facts were considered from a different angle,
no pattern would exist.
109. FLA. STAT. ch. 895 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
110. Ch. 77-334, 1977 Laws of Florida 1399. The preamble of the act provided that:
WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that organized crime is a highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread problem which annually drains billions of dollars from
the national economy by various patterns of unlawful conduct, including the ille-
gal use of force, fraud, and corruption, and WHEREAS, organized crime exists on
a large scale within the State of Florida, and it engages in the same patterns of
unlawful conduct which characterize its activities in other states, and WHEREAS,
seventeen of the twenty-one publicly identified organized crime "families" are re-
ported to operate within Florida, and because no single "family" is considered by
the other "families" to have exclusive dominion in the state, Florida is considered
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RICO in both the activity it proscribed 1 and the penalties for vio-
lation. 112 However, in 1986 the legislature eliminated Florida
RICO's strong civil remedies that allowed a private citizen injured
by racketeering conduct to recover treble damages, shifting the
damages remedy" 3 to those victimized by less inflammatory, but
nearly identical, "criminal activity.""' The shift was apparently
by organized criminal operatives as an "open state" and other organized criminal
operatives are now migrating to Florida from other states, and WHEREAS, organ-
ized crime is infiltrating and corrupting legitimate businesses operating within this
state and this infiltration and corruption uses vast amounts of money, power, and
all the techniques of violence, intimidation, and other forms of unlawful conduct
to accomplish its goals, and WHEREAS, in furtherance of such infiltration and
corruption, organized criminal operatives utilize and apply to their unlawful pur-
poses laws of the State of Florida conferring and relating to the privilege of engag-
ing in various types of business enterprises, and WHEREAS, infiltration and cor-
ruption of legitimate business provide an outlet for illegally obtained capital,
harm innocent investors, entrepreneurs, merchants, and consumers, interfere with
free competition, and thereby constitute a substantial danger to the economic and
general welfare of the State of Florida, and WHEREAS, in order to successfully
resist and eliminate such infiltration, it is necessary to provide new criminal and
civil remedies and procedures, NOW, THEREFORE, [Florida RICO is enacted].
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the preamble, with its emphasis on organized
crime infiltration of legitimate business, did not require the court to invalidate the portion
of the statute which prohibited infiltration of illicit enterprises. Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d
1178, 1180 (Fla. 1981) (construing FLA. STAT. § 934.461(3) (1977) (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 895.02(3) (1985 & Supp. 1986)) ("It is well settled that such 'prefatory language'
cannot expand or restrict the otherwise unambiguous language of a statute.")
111. Ch. 77-334, § 3, 1977 Laws of Florida 1399, 1402 (1977) (current version at FLA.
STAT. § 895.03 (1986)) made it unlawful:
(1) [Flor any person who has with criminal intent received any proceeds derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collec-
tion of an unlawful debt to use or to invest, whether directly or indirectly, any
part of such proceeds; or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof,
in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in real property,
or the establishment or operation of any enterprise. (2) [Flor any person, through
a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collection of an unlawful debt, to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enter-
prise or real property. (3) [Flor any person employed by, or associated with, any
enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt. (4)
[F]or any person to conspire or endeavor to violate any of the provisions of sub-
sections (1), (2), or (3).
112. Id. §§ 4-5 (current versions at FLA. STAT. §§ 895.04-05 (1985 & Supp. 1986). The
criminal penalties remain the same. Conviction under Florida RICO is punishable by up to
30 years in prison and a fine of $10,000 or three times the "gross value gained or ... gross
loss caused" by the racketeering conduct. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082-83 (1985).
113. Private plaintiffs may still seek to enjoin defendants from continuing to engage in
the prohibited conduct. FLA. STAT. §§ 895.05(1),(6) (Supp. 1986).
114. Ch. 86-277, § 3, 1986 Laws of Florida 2033, 2036-39 (1986) (codified at FLA. STAT.
ch. 772 (Supp. 1986)). "Criminal activity" is defined as conduct prohibited by numerous
state laws and the federal RICO provisions. The enumerated list of over 30 state laws which
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made for aesthetic reasons because of the negative connotation at-
tached to the label of "racketeer" and the apparent frequency with
which a RICO claim was appended to private claims of fraud." 6
Thomas R. Tedcastle, Staff Attorney for the Judiciary Committee
of the Florida House of Representatives, testified before the Sub-
committee on the Court System that some financial institutions
were upset at the publicity and negative connotations surrounding
the word racketeer." 6 According to Tedcastle, these financial insti-
tutions would not proceed with a foreclosure out of fear that the
irate plaintiff would claim fraud in the contract and label the insti-
tution a racketeer, which carries a message of "organized crime."
Whether or not "criminal" is a more palatable label than racket-
eer, the creation of chapter 772 to house the treble damages rem-
edy essentially makes this chapter the operative statute for private
plaintiffs injured by particular kinds of criminal conduct. As such,
it is important to consider the concept of "pattern" in both RICO
and chapter 772.
The "pattern" definition in Florida RICO is nearly identical to
the federal statute provision noted by the United States Supreme
Court in Sedima and by numerous other lower federal courts."' It
is defined to "mean engaging in at least two incidents of racketeer-
ing conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accom-
plices, victims, or methods of commission or that otherwise are in-
terrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated
constitute "criminal activity" differs from that which was prohibited by Florida RICO as
"racketeering activity" in only a handful of instances.
115. It is important to note that the government may still choose to label one a racketeer
and still be entitled to treble damages in a civil suit. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(7) (Supp. 1986)
provides:
The state, including any of its agencies, instrumentalities, subdivisions, or munici-
palities, if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has been injured by
reason of any violation of the provisions of s. 895.03, shall have a cause of action
for threefold the actual damages sustained and shall also recover attorneys' fees in
the trial and appellate courts and costs of investigation and litigation, reasonably
incurred. In no event shall punitive damages be awarded. The defendant shall be
entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs upon a finding that
the claimant raised a claim which was without substantial factual or legal support.
116. Fla. H.R., Committee of Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Court System, tape re-
cording of proceedings (April 9, 1986) (on file with committee).
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1982); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14; Stofsky, 409 F. Supp.
609, supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. The motivation of the Legislature in adopt-
ing this language has not escaped the notice of the Florida Supreme Court. In Moorehead v.
State, 383 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1980), the court held that the pattern definition was not
unconstitutionally vague, stating that the Florida Legislature "incorporated the federal case
law" in defining pattern in this manner and that specifically including interrelated incidents
"clarifies the defintion."
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incidents." '118 "Pattern of criminal activity" is identically defined,
with the additional proviso that it "shall not include two or more
incidents of fraudulent conduct arising out of a single contract or
transaction against one or more related persons." 119 Presumably
then, the government can prosecute fraudulent conduct arising out
of a single contract under the RICO provision, but private individ-
uals cannot under their chapter 772 remedies.
Only a handful of cases construe Florida RICO, 120 and of those,
only a few construe the "pattern" element. As of yet no reported
cases deal with the new chapter 772.
The Florida Supreme Court dealt with "pattern" in Bowden v.
State12' by stating that it required "proof that a continuity of par-
ticular criminal activity exists." Noting that this construction was
similar to that of the federal district court in Stofsky, 22 the court
found that the statutory definition "clearly requires more than ac-
cidental or unrelated instances of proscribed behavior. "123 The
court stated that such construction would result in RICO prosecu-
118. FLA. STAT. § 895.02(4) (1985).
119. FLA. STAT. § 772.102(4) (Supp. 1986).
120. See, e.g., Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1981) (double jeopardy principles
prevented subsequent RICO prosecution of defendant convicted of maintaining a house of
prostitution); Cantrell v. State, 403 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1981) (RICO held not to be unconstitu-
tionally vague); Bowden v. State, 402 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1981) (RICO not unconstitutionally
vague and does not unconstitutionally prohibit freedom of association); Dorsey v. State, 402
So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (enterprise includes both licit and illicit organizations); State v.
Whiddon, 384 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 1980) (only one of the two predicate acts must have oc-
curred after RICO's effective date); Moorehead v. State, 383 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1980) (defini-
tion of pattern which requires interrelated incidents is not unconstitutionally vague); State
v. Russo, 493 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (Florida RICO requires two incidents of racke-
teering conduct, not merely two predicate acts); Finkelstein v. Southeast Bank, 490 So. 2d
976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (denied injunction to prohibit distribution of family trust while
RICO action pending) (for a good discussion of this case, see Note, Plaintiffs Under Florida
RICO Must Meet Traditional Equity Requirements When Seeking Temporary Injunctions
to Safeguard Assets, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 975 (1987)); Banderas v. Banco Central del Ecua-
dor, 461 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (scheme to defraud Ecuadoran government by
presenting fraudulent statements for medical services and equipment constituted a pattern
of activity); Beatty v. State, 418 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (information which failed to
state with particularity the predicate acts charged was found to be insufficient); Dean v.
State, 414 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (insufficient allegation of proper venue in infor-
mation waived where defendants were told they had a right to be tried where crimes took
place); State v. Bowen, 413 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (a sole proprietor engaged in a
pattern of racketeering activity may be prosecuted under RICO); DeLisi v. Smith, 401 So.
2d 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (attorney general must bear burden of proof for preliminary
injunctive relief under RICO).
121. 402 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 1981).
122. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
123. Bowden, 402 So. 2d at 1174.
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tions aimed at "the professional or career criminal and not non-
racketeers who have committed relatively minor crimes.' 124
However, Bowden is not particularly helpful because it gives lit-
tle guidance as to what the court views as "similar" or "interre-
lated" or what proof would constitute a showing of "continuity."
The opinion sheds little light on whether a pattern existed in the
case at bar because the no contest pleas were appealed solely on
the constitutionality of Florida RICO. That is, the appellants ar-
gued that RICO was vague and overbroad and that it imposed lia-
bility upon constitutionally protected activities such as freedom of
association. Thus, the court was not asked to rule on whether vio-
lations of the state's obscenity statute, the predicate acts in the
case before it, constituted a pattern. While the court anticipated
Sedima by requiring continuity of criminal activity, it did not es-
tablish any sort of guideline to determine when such continuity ex-
ists. Nor did the court suggest, even in dicta, what it meant by
similar or related activities. The opinion gives no clue whether the
high court will apply a single episode or common scheme analysis,
the more common-sensical transactional approach, or whether it
will chart a new course.
The Third District Court of Appeal found that a pattern suffi-
cient to invoke RICO existed in a scheme to defraud the
Ecuadoran government in Banderas v. Banco Central del Ecua-
dor.2 " There, the bank alleged that the defendants submitted
some seventy fraudulent bills to the bank indicating payment and
receipt of medical care in the United States and importation of
certain machinery into Ecuador. An Ecuadoran program provided
a favorable currency exchange rate to citizens who either received
medical care or imported machinery. The court found that RICO
covered exactly this sort of activity. "This was a well organized,
on-going, systematic, criminal scheme devised by appellants to de-
fraud the government of Ecuador-their own government."'2 6
Again, Banderas is not particularly instructive. While clearly
reaching the right result, the court left the concept of "pattern"
largely undefined. Perhaps the court in Banderas, like its counter-
parts in the federal system, found a pattern because it also was
influenced by the sheer number of fraudulent invoices and the long
period of time involved. 27
124. Id.
125. 461 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
126. Id. at 270.
127. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Apparently the courts are stuck, for now, with interpreting
RICO unaided. They will find little help from prosecutorial guide-
lines. The United States Attorney's Manual states that "[n]o in-
dictment shall be brought charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) based upon a pattern of racketeering activity growing out
of a single criminal episode or transaction."128 The purpose of the
guideline, according to the manual, "is to prevent a pattern of
racketeering activity being charged which lacks the attributes
which Congress had in mind but which is literally within the lan-
guage of the statute. ' 12 9 However, the manual does not define "sin-
gle episode or transaction," so it merely reflects what many courts
have been saying all along.
The courts should be sensitive to the possibility that pattern
means something different depending on what section of RICO is
involved. Perhaps Congress could not specifically define pattern
because the definition varies. Limiting RICO's section 1962(c) ap-
plication to multiple schemes could have significant consequences
if that limitation is extended to sections 1962(a) and (b) cases. As
the court noted in Paul S. Mullin & Associates v. Bassett,130 a re-
quirement for multiple schemes is subject to "manipulative
semantics":
For example, an attempt by a racketeering enterprise to infiltrate
General Motors could involve countless acts of mail fraud, extor-
tion, securities fraud, and bribery. One could argue, however, that
only one criminal scheme is involved because only one company
was subverted. Under this view, a "pattern" would come into ex-
istence only after the same enterprise began to infiltrate Chrysler
or Ford. On the other hand, the enterprise, in infiltrating General
Motors, undoubtedly had committed criminal acts of a sufficient
number and variety, over a sufficient period of time, to suggest
the existence of an elaborate design. This should be enough to
create a "pattern."13' 1
Perhaps the courts should also interpret "related" to require
only a relationship to the enterprise and not between the acts
128. U.S. ATrORNEY'S MANUAL, Ch. 110, at 14 (1984).
129. Id.
130. 632 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1986).
131. Id. at 541.
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themselves. The court in Torwest DBC, Inc.. v. Dick'32 provided a
good definition of relationship, which varied depending on what
section of 1962 was charged. For a section 1962(a) violation, "the
predicate acts must be related in the sense that they produce pro-
ceeds which are then invested in an enterprise.' 33 A section
1962(b) violation requires that the acts be related to acquiring or
maintaining control of an enterprise and a section 1962(c) violation
mandates that "the acts be related to the conduct of the affairs of
the enterprise."'"1 4 Courts should shift the focus from a narrow look
at the acts only to an examination of the activity and its relation-
ship to the prohibited conduct. The courts should consider pattern
in terms of the particular section of RICO at issue. Arguably this is
precisely the meaning Congress intended when it chose not to be
explicit about "pattern."
The alternative, if relationship and common scheme are read
narrowly, is to preclude RICO from being used to combat truly or-
ganized crime. If the acts are related, a court is likely to find them
part of a single episode and exclude RICO. As noted earlier, if the
acts must be related to each other and in pursuit of a common
scheme, then diversified criminal activity could be beyond its
reach. Only if common scheme is interpreted broadly to mean
achieving the prohibited conduct, and if episode is restricted to
those acts proximate in time, can RICO exist within these judi-
cially-imposed parameters.
Because Florida's RICO statute and its newly-created criminal
activity provisions have been closely patterned after federal RICO,
the courts would do well to consider and avoid the pitfalls that
have befallen the federal courts. As yet, the Florida courts have
not strictly defined "pattern." They, too, should consider whether
a different definition should attach depending on what section of
the statute is claimed to have been violated. They, too, should con-
sider the "interrelatedness" aspect of pattern as perhaps pertain-
ing to the relationship to the "enterprise" and not necessarily be-
tween the predicate "incidents" themselves. At the very least, the
courts should avoid developing a mechanistic test that is likely to
prove unworkable in most instances and which would thwart legis-
lative intent that habitual criminals be punished. Florida courts
132. 628 F. Supp. 163 (D. Colo. 1986), aff d, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987).
133. Id. at 166.
134. Id.
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have an opportunity to learn from the federal struggle, and to
avoid making the same mistakes.
